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Purpose: The present paper analyses the interaction between takeover defenses and the 
strength of the economy in two countries, the United Kingdom (UK) and Greece. Both have 
implemented the EU Takeover Directive in their jurisdictions but have significant differences 
in the characteristics of their economies.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: A brief description of takeovers and potential takeover 
defenses is provided, followed by the presentation of the two countries’ economic market 
highlighting the factors that have led to two separate market structures. Subsequently, a 
thorough comparative discussion is presented on the different application of takeover 
defenses in the UK and Greece in relation to their economic and market characteristics with 
reference to the European Union harmonization. 
Findings: The UK is considered a strong economy operating in a market for corporate 
control with dispersed ownership structure, therefore takeover defences are encountered 
regularly, whereas Greece is viewed as a weak economy operating in a premature non-
contestable market with concentrated ownership structure and thus, takeover defences are 
less encountered. 
Practical Implications: The comparative research on takeover defenses between these two 
countries aims to promote the understanding of the operation of takeover defenses in 
economies with differences in strength, especially within the concept of EU harmonization. 
The analysis also, aims to offer further knowledge on the way economic growth and market 
structure characteristics influence takeover defenses and vice-versa.  
Originality/Value: Moreover, it provides a framework for the consideration of the 
consequences in the light of UK exiting the EU as well as for the potential policies to be 
implemented both in the UK and in the EU. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The European Commission considers takeovers as a significant factor for the 
economic integration strategy of the EU harmonisation. As a result, the Takeover 
Directive was issued in 2004 to regulate takeover bids within the European Union. 
According to Article 2(1)(a) of the Takeover Directive 2004, a ‘takeover bid’ is a 
public offer made to the shareholders of a target company by a bidder in order “to 
acquire all or some of those securities...which...has as its objective the acquisition of 
control of the offeree company”.  
 
However, the different economic, market, legal and cultural structures in which each 
Member State operates are crucial factors for the ability to formulate a unified 
framework. Strong economies, such as the UK, operate under different models of 
corporate structures and thus, have a different approach to takeovers and takeover 
defenses, as compared to weak economies, such as Greece. The present paper will 
examine the differences between strong and weak economies regarding the interplay 
of influence between the two economies and the regulation of takeovers and their 
relevant defenses. 
 
2. Hostile Takeovers 
 
Takeover bids can be either friendly or hostile. The case of hostile takeovers 
involves the employment of various defenses by the target company. Such takeover 
defenses can be characterised as frustrating or defensive actions (Kraakman, 2009). 
Frustrating acts are a type of defenses which are employed by the target board of 
directors when it believes there is an imminent takeover threat or when a takeover 
bid has already been made (Ogowewo, 1997). The result of these takeover defenses 
is the frustration or even the total obstruction of the takeover. However, there is the 
‘no frustration’ rule that prevents the board from acquiring such defenses (for the 
EU: Takeover Directive 2004, Article 9; for the UK: Rule 21.1 Takeover Code; for 
Greece Article 14(1) Law 3461/2006). 
 
The test used to examine under what category a defense falls is considering whether 
the actions of the target board cause either two situations (Ogowewo, 2007). Firstly, 
acts obtained by the board of directors that result in the ‘material corruption of the 
decision-making process’ are considered as frustrating actions. Secondly, actions 
that cause the target shareholders to become deprived of their right to decide on the 
matter are also, considered frustrating. They can be deprived due to the fact that the 
hostile bidder revoked the takeover offer or because the shareholders were unable as 
a matter of fact because of dilution of shares, they were not allowed in the meeting. 
Hence, if either of the aforementioned two results occurs, the defenses used were 
frustrating actions which are prohibited. The only situations in which frustrating acts 
can be obtained are when they are frustrating the bidder and not the target company 
or its shareholders and when the target shareholders have given prior approval 
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(Kraakman, 2009). These actions can be divided in defenses taken with or without 
prior shareholder or panel approval. 
 
Defensive actions, as compared to frustrating action, are defenses that the law 
permits the board of directors to employ when a takeover bid becomes imminent or 
when a takeover offer has already been made (Kraakman, 2009). The defenses are 
usually used as a means for target shareholders influence and neither law nor 
regulations prohibit them. It is crucial to state that the employment of such defensive 
actions does not lead to the hindering or the material corruption of the shareholder’s 
decision-making process. There is a variety of defensive actions that can be used, 
such as lobbying, the issuing of defense documents or profit forecasts (Ogowewo, 
2003) and the usage of White Knight or White Squire (Tachmatzidi, 2017; 2018). 
 
3. Takeover Defenses and their Development in the UK and Greece 
 
3.1 Takeover Defenses Overview 
 
The UK has implemented the European Takeover Directive (Directive 2004/25/EC) 
with the UK Takeover Code via the Companies Act 2006, which provides the 
regulation of takeovers. According to the UK Takeover Code, takeover defenses 
appear to be heavily regulated in the UK market (Tachmatzidi, 2018). This results in 
the provision of a more secure and stable economic and business environment; a 
market in which both the company seeking to perform a hostile takeover and the 
target company are usually aware of the takeover technics as well as respective 
defenses employed. 
 
In Greece, takeovers are regulated with the ‘Takeover Bid Law, Law 3461/2006 
which has implemented the EU Takeover Directive (Karatzas, 2012). Research 
however, demonstrates that due to the economic and market structure of Greece, 
takeovers and takeover defenses are not heavily regulated (Tachmatzidi, 2017). As a 
result, Greek law permits a broader approach regarding the regulation of defenses 
that might potentially obstruct a hostile takeover. 
 
3.2 Statistical Indicators 
 
It is important to consider certain indicators that differentiate a strong to a weak 
economy, in particular the UK to Greece. According to Eurostat, the following are 
important indicators of the economic state of the two countries (Eurostat, 2016).  In 
relation to the UK, for 2015, the GDP was 2,2% sharing a steady trend around 2% 
for the last six years, the debt 89,2% of GDP (EU average 85,2%) and the Consumer 
Price Index 0%. In June 2016, unemployment was 4,9%. As regards Greece, for 
2015, the GDP was -0,2% following an unstable direction (2010: -5,5%, 2011: -
9,1%, 2012: -7,3%, 2013: -3,2%, 2014: 0,7%), the debt 176,9% of GDP and the 
Consumer Index Price -1,1%. In June 2016, unemployment was 23,3% of which 
youth unemployment was 47,4%. Since 2010, there have been three “Memorandum 
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of Agreements” between Greece and the EU in order to deal with the significant 
Greek economic problems. Moreover, there have been capital controls since June 
2015. The above allows considering the UK as a strong economy and Greece as a 
weak economy. 
 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the market for corporate control will be more 
advanced in an economy with a dispersed ownership structure in comparison to a 
concentrated ownership structure which has less investors operating (Ipekel, 2004; 
Arize et al., 2018). Therefore, it is crucial to examine the market structure and the 
economy of the two countries; the UK and Greece. 
 
3.3 Formulation of Market Structure and Economy in the UK 
 
The UK economy is operating in a market for corporate control with a dispersed 
ownership structure, in which takeovers and takeover defenses are a usual practice 
(Tachmatzidi, 2018). It is interesting to examine how the UK reached to the 
formation of this market.  
 
After the World War II, inflation rose to very high levels, the share prices of 
companies were artificially low and most companies were not paying dividends 
(Stokka, 2013). Even though the macroeconomic indicators were poor, the corporate 
assets were substantial. As a result, companies were viewed as appealing targets to 
be acquired. Bidders would target companies with the aforementioned 
characteristics, buy them and later sell them by making profit.  
 
The market therefore, in the early fifties, gave rise to many takeovers, since the 
acquisition of companies was easy due to their characteristics (Okanigbuan, 2013). 
However, the board of directors usually did not consent with the takeovers, thus the 
takeovers were mostly hostile. Consequently, the development of takeover defenses 
by UK boards of directors that did not agree with takeover offers was also, 
developed. An example (Stokka, 2013) of a defense measure adopted at the time, in 
1953, was by the Berkley Hotel, which employed a takeover defense (White Knight) 
and exchanged its assets for shares in the friendly company. 
 
However, the target shareholders viewed the takeover defenses employed by the 
boards as improper and claimed that the board should not be allowed to proceed in 
such actions without having prior shareholder approval (Stokka, 2013). These 
debates led to the creation of the city Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1968, which 
was managed by the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. However, the Panel at 
the time had no legal enforcement powers over the City Code. Nonetheless, when 
the European Takeover Directive was implemented in 2006, Article 4.5 required the 
member states, including the UK, to appoint appropriate authorities for the 
supervision of takeover offers. As a result, the City Code acquired statutory power 
by the Companies Act 2006 and hence, the Panel had the authority to issue 
judgments and enforce sanctions in relation to non-compliance with the City Code. 
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The current version under which takeover defenses are regulated in the UK is the 
UK Takeover Code eleventh edition of 20 May 2013, herein referred to as the UK 
Takeover Code. 
 
3.4 The Takeovers (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 
 
In light of the UK exiting the European Union and due to the fact that the UK has 
implemented the EU Takeover Directive for the regulation of takeovers, which will 
cease to apply after the exit, new regulation is now required for takeovers and their 
defenses. As a result, The Takeovers (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 was 
drafted and subsequently, approved by each House of Parliament in February 11th 
2019. Furthermore, certain amendments were also introduced to Part 28 of the 
Companies Act 2006, which was the Act via which the UK Takeover Code was 
implemented.  
 
The aim of the new Regulations is to provide with certain amendments and thus, a 
new framework under which takeovers will operate after the UK’s exit from the EU, 
by remaining however as close as possible to the already existing framework. For 
this reason, most amendments are mainly technical and not significantly altering the 
already existing takeover regulations. Nonetheless, there are significant points to be 
addressed which affect procedural aspects of takeovers and therefore, takeover 
defenses.  
 
The aforementioned Regulations are scheduled to come into force on the date of the 
UK’s formal exit, whether said exit occurs without a deal or with a deal, which will 
most likely include a transitional period too. 
 
3.5 Formulation of Market Structure and Economy in Greece 
 
Regarding the Greek market, the initial consideration for the market for corporate 
control occurred in the early 1990’s due to the European Union integrating processes 
(Fragakis, 2010). The majority of the Greek companies were family owned and in 
order to obtain a more concrete and powerful position in the market, they started to 
merge and form larger companies. However, due to the economic crisis in 2009, the 
market growth came to a standstill, leading to an uncertain and unstable political and 
economic environment. As a result, the market characteristics hindered the 
development of market of corporate control (Drakopoulos, 2014). 
 
The overall market structure remained underdeveloped, leading to the majority of 
the Greek companies being controlled either by families or the State. Taking into 
account that the Greek market is highly concentrated, even the companies that are 
not state owned or family owned are not able to perform in a dynamic and 
competitive manner (Fragakis, 2010). Consequently, investors are not attracted to 
perform investments in a market with such characteristics, leading to reduced 
economic growth and development. The Greek economy therefore, can be 
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characterised as premature, without a well-developed market that permits takeovers. 
There are also, other characteristics in Greece involving cultural aspects that obstruct 
market development; however they will not be examined in the present paper. 
 
Another characteristic demonstrating that the Greek market is not a market for 
corporate control is the fact that it is not contestable (Tachmatzidi, 2017), as 
compared to the UK market which is considered contestable. Contestable markets 
are defined as having low barriers to entry or exit for companies and there are low 
sunk costs (Arnold, 2010). Thus, companies operating in contestable markets tend to 
be more productive and competitive because of the potential threat of new 
companies entering the market. As a result, contestable markets are considered as 
dynamic and highly competitive. 
 
3.6 Greek Market Developments 
 
According to research by PwC (PwC, 2016), mergers and acquisitions in Greece 
although facing a reduction in the period 2008-2012, there has been a slow increase 
from 2013 onwards (Kitsios, 2016). For instance, in 2012 the average transaction 
value was €99m, in contrast with 2013 which was €257m. This demonstrates a move 
of the Greek economy towards growth. Furthermore, it is estimated that the 
transactions during 2016 might be worth of more than €7bn (PwC, 2015). The 
transactions expected to help the growth of the Greek economy are firstly considered 
with privatisations of public companies, which might be worth more than €2bn 
(PwC, 2015). Other important areas of transactions will be the sale of non-core 
activities of the Greek banks, as well as private transactions of major established 
companies. 
 
Therefore, Greece currently has a premature market for corporate control due to the 
economic crisis, the format of the market and cultural reasons (Fragakis, 2010). 
Nonetheless, Greece is in a transitional stage, as many laws are being implemented 
or amended. Furthermore, recent developments, such as takeovers, privatisations and 
recapitalizations of Greek banks, demonstrate a degree of consolidation, which in the 
long-term would enable a market for corporate control. Within this market, 
takeovers and takeover defenses would be a reality and often practice (Tachmatzidi, 
2017). 
 
4. Comparative Analysis between the UK and Greece 
 
One of the fundamental purposes of the European Union is the complete elimination 
of trade barriers. This could be evidenced in Article 56 of the EC Treaty which 
explicitly states that ‘all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member 
States … shall be prohibited’. On the other hand, Article 12 of the Takeover 
Directive provides for an optional nature of the board neutrality rule and it does not 
consider it as mandatory practice for all Member States in the European Union. As a 
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result, this optionality could be considered as forming an obstacle to the free capital 
movement. 
 
However, as stated earlier in this paper, it is considered difficult to provide a 
harmonized framework across Europe in relation to takeover defenses regulation. 
The differences in the market structures during the historical formulation have led to 
different economic approaches. Additionally, the economic crisis has affected many 
Member States who were already considered to be weaker economies as compared 
to other stronger ones. Therefore, although harmonisation is a primary goal, similar 
approaches towards all countries are not currently feasible (Mukwiri, 2008).  
 
A main reason for the difference of approach regarding takeover defenses between 
the UK, as strong economy, and Greece, as a weak economy, is the economic 
environment. The UK economy offers a more consistent and secure environment 
that promotes investments, whereas the Greek economy hinders market development 
because the macroeconomic indicators are not promising for profits, at least in short 
and mid-term. 
 
Another reason justifying the different approaches between the UK and Greece is the 
ownership structure of the market. The UK has a dispersed ownership structure, 
which means that there are many investors having shares in a company (Dinga, 
2005). Furthermore, it is a mature market regarding equity liquidity and thus, attracts 
more takeover bids and as a result, has also, more defenses from boards that try to 
defend the companies. However, it has been argued that diffused ownership does not 
entail high monitoring of the board and leads to the possibility of managers acting 
for their own self-serving motives instead of maximizing shareholder value (Dinga, 
2005). Nonetheless, corporate governance can place mechanisms to face this 
problem (Goergen, 2005). 
 
In contrast, Greece operates within a concentrated ownership structure as stated 
previously in this paper. Shares are held by large block holders and they have more 
direct control in the management of the company (Dinga, 2005). The majority of the 
companies are either family or state-owned and the ownership is characterized as 
concentrated. Since the board of directors and the shareholders have a close 
relationship, the former will be highly motivated to either manage the company in an 
effective way or find the best possible takeover offer (Kachaner, 2012). This 
ownership structure though, has limited diversity and thus, it is not cost efficient for 
the shareholders. As a result, in Greece there are not that many takeovers as there are 
in the UK (Gramatidis and Koromantzos, 2015), due to their different ownership 
structures.  
 
Another area which highlights the reason for the different approach is contestability. 
The UK can be considered as operating in a contestable market because of the low 
entry and exit barriers. The institutional investors have a major role in the market, 
reliance is placed on finance equity and there is high chance of hiring new managers 
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or dislodging current ones. Thus, there is an open market for corporate control, 
which provides the board of directors with incentives in order to maximize the target 
shareholder wealth instead of fulfilling their self-serving interests (Ruling, 2012). In 
particular, the board of directors has the obligation to take decisions that will 
maximize the value of the company’s shares and often there is a conflict of interest 
between on the one hand, the effort of the board to retain its job position and on the 
other hand, the shareholders who might believe a takeover is more advantageous.  
 
However, in the open market for corporate control in the UK, the board faces the 
threat that if it underperforms or tries to fulfill its own motives, it could be replaced 
by another company that takes over. Takeovers in this sense act as a disciplinary tool 
for the board, as they compel them to work at their full potential for the company. 
As a result, target shareholders benefit because their wealth and the share prices 
increases, as the company is highly managed and resources are used more 
effectively. Furthermore, if the board decides to employ takeover defenses, its 
motives could be questioned, because it can be inferred that it is more interested in 
retaining its position than satisfying the interests of the target shareholders which is 
the reason why the board is employed in the first place. 
 
On the other hand, Greece is not considered as performing in a contestable market. It 
is a weaker economy compared to the UK, with the majority of the companies being 
family or state owned. As a result, the target board is in the most qualified position 
to decide whether takeover defenses should be employed in the case of a hostile bid 
(Ruling, 2012).  Since they are the executives in the company, they have the most 
knowledge and relevant experience to decide what is best for the target shareholders 
and the company in general. Especially in the case of Greece where the family 
owned companies have a huge interest of both increasing the shareholder value and 
not losing their position due to poor management performance. The same applies for 
the board in state-owned companies, as there is a high incentive of retaining the 
control of the company and increasing its economic wealth. Therefore, even though 
the board might employ takeover defenses, there is still a disciplinary effect from the 
possibility of a hostile takeover fighting back the defenses (Ruling, 2012). 
Additionally, the board by employing defenses can give the opportunity to both the 
shareholders and itself to consider fully if the takeover bid is beneficial for the target 
or not, as the takeover procedure is being delayed (Ruling, 2012). 
 
Nonetheless, since the Greek economic crisis, massive reforms have been 
undertaken, resulting to the increase of investments, takeover transactions and 
privatisations. One of the major ongoing changes that is crucial to mention is the 
privatisation of the public sector. Until recently, some of the biggest companies in 
Greece where owned by the public sector. However, this creates problems of 
concentration of ownership and since the economy is in crisis, there are no new 
investments made due to the lack of funds. Over recent years, many public 
companies have been sold already or are in the process of being sold to foreign or 
domestic private investors; the positive effects brought by the changes might lead 
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the Greek economy towards the development of a market for corporate control, 
which will contain takeovers and takeover defenses. 
 
These investments have already started to boost the economy, leading to wider 
participation and more investors interacting in the market place, thus creating a more 
diffused ownership. It is claimed that there are more agency costs created in 
companies which have a complicated ownership structure, as opposed to the family 
owned or the companies which one person is the owner and the manager as well 
(Gogineni et al., 2013). Since agency costs are internal problems that a company is 
facing, the need for external regulation is required in order to assist the efficient 
preservation and regulation of the market. Thus, this will slowly create the need for a 
market for corporate control, which will regulate companies from the external to the 
company framework. Furthermore, a diffused ownership structure creates more 
liquidity which will also, lead towards the development of a market for corporate 
control. In such a market, takeovers are facilitated, thus the blooming of takeover 
defenses will occur in situations where the board of directors does not agree with an 
imminent takeover or with a takeover offer that has been made. 
 
In sum, there seems to be interplay of influence between the characteristics of an 
economy, such as market security, ownership structure of the market, contestability, 
and the regulated employment of takeovers and takeover defenses. 
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
In conclusion, the present paper is a comparative research of takeover defenses in 
strong and weak economies, represented by the UK and Greece respectively. The 
analysis conducted aims to offer further knowledge on the way economic growth 
and market structure characteristics influence takeover defenses and vice-versa.  
 
A strong economy, such as the UK economy, is perceived as operating in a 
contestable market. It could be suggested that takeover defenses are more regularly 
encountered in high contestable markets with dispersed ownership structures, 
whereas they are less present in premature, non-contestable markets with 
concentrated ownerships. Due to the role of the institutional investors and the 
reliance on finance equity, there is greater space for corporate control. On the 
contrary, a weak economy, such as Greece, is not considered as operating in a 
contestable market and therefore, takeovers and takeover defenses are not 
encountered as often. 
 
Furthermore, the comparative analysis also, presents that the UK, due to its long 
experience in takeover defenses, is heavily regulated regarding possible defenses 
employed by the target board of directors. In contrast, Greece has little experience in 
cases relating to takeover defenses, due to its weak economic status and 
consequently it provides less regulation for defenses than the UK. Although 
regulation is provided for certain frustrating and defensive actions, there are 
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instances in which unregulated actions by the target board, with the use of Greek 
laws, can possibly be employed as takeover defenses. 
 
However, there have been several schemes and bailout mechanisms implemented 
since the start of the economic crisis in Greece, in the effort of creating stability and 
certainty in the economic market. Considering these latest reforms occurring in 
Greece and the potential progress towards the development of a market for corporate 
control, further research on advancing the regulation in takeover defenses might be 
required. Current developments involving the UK’s exit from the European Union 
require consideration to be given on whether the well-established market structure 
and secure economic environment currently in the UK will undergo changes and 
how these will affect the regulation of takeovers and their defenses.  
 
Further research could be conducted in order to examine the framework and future, 
potentially, required regulation, especially in the light of the UK exiting the EU, 
between different economic and market structures. Takeovers, takeover defenses and 
their relevant regulation are important parameters of the economy and market 
activity. The present paper aimed to enlighten the interplay between the strength of 
the economy and the takeover defenses and vice versa. Especially, within the 
framework of the UK exiting the EU developments, it is important to have a 
thorough consideration on how the market will be regulated regarding takeovers and 
takeover defenses. Furthermore, given such an important event, it is suggested that 
research could further assess the impact or the potential economic volatility both in 
the UK as well as the EU. Moreover, further research is needed to address the issue 
of takeovers and takeover defenses regulation within the EU considering the 
differences in the economy of the different EU States. It is strongly recommended a 
thorough cooperation between market representatives and lawmakers to address the 
short-, mid- and long-term consequences. 
 
Finally, the above analysis places particular importance on considering takeovers 
and takeover defenses under a worldwide framework and makes a suggestion on 
whether a common basic framework in relation to takeover regulation could be 
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